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BEYOND THE “NATURE” OF DATA: 
OBSTACLES TO PROTECTING SENSITIVE 
INFORMATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
Müge Fazlioglu* 
ABSTRACT 
Privacy and data protection laws in both the European Union and 
the United States impose heightened obligations on data controllers 
and processors that handle data deemed to be of a “sensitive” nature, 
such as health information, financial information, and information 
concerning minors.  But the central assumptions that underlie these 
special protections, imposed through various laws on both sides of the 
Atlantic, have lagged behind modernization and technological 
advancements. 
The current scheme of sensitive data protection faces three primary 
obstacles, which, taken together, show that prioritization of sensitive 
information is no longer sufficient on its own to deal with the most 
significant privacy risks to individuals.  The first challenge is the rapid 
growth in data-collecting technologies, which have led to the 
emergence of new types of data.  This new information can range 
from behavioral data produced by online activity and collected by 
social networking sites, to geolocation data produced by cell phone 
and other smart devices that monitor users’ movements and activities.  
The second challenge, closely related to the first, is that non-
identifiable, non-sensitive types of data can still be linked to an 
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identity or used to reveal or infer sensitive data using innovative 
analytic techniques.  Many datasets that attempt to anonymize or de-
identify data — that is, tools that expunge personally-identifying 
information such as names, addresses, or dates of birth — may still be 
combined with other datasets to re-identify individuals.  The third and 
final obstacle is that the “sensitivity” of a given piece of information 
can change depending on the context of its use.  This means that the 
sensitivity level of a piece of data is not solely a function of its nature 
or type, but also of the way in which it is used or the ends for which it 
is utilized.  Thus, privacy and data protection laws that assume 
sensitivity is a static quality of certain data types are not in sync with 
the reality of data use. 
This Article concludes by suggesting ways policymakers can 
rethink the prioritization of sensitive information and address newly-
emerging risks to information privacy.  Relying entirely on the 
sensitivity level of a piece of data to determine the risks associated 
with it will fall short of adequately protecting data subjects’ privacy.  
Data controllers and regulators must therefore consider other factors, 
in addition to the category of data or its sensitivity level, such as 
whether it can be used in combination with other publicly-available 
data to uniquely identify a person, the likelihood it can be linked to or 
reveal sensitive data about a person, and the context of the data use, 
when determining the risks posed by data processing.  Laws also 
ought to extend protection to newly-emerging types of data that are 
sensitive in nature, such as web-browsing histories and longitudinal 
location data.  Law and policymakers should ultimately move beyond 
the category-based regulation of data to effectively protect privacy 
today. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Privacy and data protection laws in both the European Union and 
the United States impose conditions on the processing of certain 
kinds of personally identifying information, referred to as sensitive 
data, sensitive information, or special categories of information.  The 
sensitivity of a given piece of information is often used to determine 
how much legal protection should be afforded to it.  This is because 
greater consequences are likely to result from the misuse of sensitive 
information compared to misuse of less sensitive or non-sensitive 
information.  Thus, information sensitivity is associated with risk.  
Indeed, protecting sensitive data has become one of the most 
important issues in the domain of risk management in recent years. 
The categories of information that data protection and privacy laws 
have tended to recognize as sensitive include health data, financial 
data, and other types of information considered to be of an intimate 
or personal nature.  The exposure of these types of information is 
thought to bring about the most severe kinds of privacy harms.  And 
yet, we live in an era where almost any piece of data about a person, 
sensitive or not, can be linked to their identity.  Further, innocuous 
bits of information can be aggregated from multiple sources that, 
when observed as a whole,  reveal sensitive attributes about a person.  
Laws that treat certain types of information as warranting heightened 
legal obligations, therefore, may ultimately fail to adequately protect 
privacy if they ignore how non-sensitive data can be linked to 
sensitive data.  This Article focuses on understanding why making this 
link is so vital and what can be done to incorporate a more nuanced 
conceptualization of the categorization of sensitive data in privacy 
and data protection law and policymaking. 
Ultimately, the reality of a technologically- and data-dependent 
world means that lawmakers face an uphill battle and must be willing 
to continuously evaluate and potentially expand the list of data types 
that receive heightened legal protections.  Additionally, lawmakers 
must address the way in which seemingly innocuous pieces of 
information can be connected to sensitive types of data, as 
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developments in technology and big data have diminished the utility 
of the longstanding divide between sensitive and non-sensitive data.  
In line with this concern, policymakers must also reconsider the 
effectiveness of current approaches to data protection, most of which 
prioritize information solely according to its nature, type, or category.  
Additionally, lawmakers should account for whether the data can be 
readily combined with other publicly-available information to 
uniquely identify a person, the likelihood that it can be linked to or 
reveal sensitive information, and the context of data use when 
determining what legal protections should be afforded to it. 
Before analyzing these obstacles and discussing ways of addressing 
them, Part I of this Article explains why certain types of information, 
such as health or financial data, merit heightened legal protections 
and impose heavier obligations on data processors, collectors, and 
providers.  This is done by focusing on the levels of risk associated 
with certain types of data across the United States and European 
Union.  Part II of this piece dives into the myriad obstacles that exist 
in protecting sensitive data, examining how current legal protections 
are insufficient.  Additionally, Part II discusses why proper 
protections for sensitive information are so vital.  Part III suggests 
various ways in which policymakers ought to rethink sensitive data, 
and the kind of impact this rethinking can have on privacy rights and 
data protections. 
I.  PRIORITIZING SENSITIVE DATA 
This Article begins by explaining why the severity of privacy harms 
that arise from misuse of sensitive data are often greater than the 
privacy harms associated with misuse of non-sensitive types of data.  
It then examines the reliance of privacy and data protection laws on 
the type, nature, or category of information to prioritize protection.  
Laws that prioritize sensitive information rely on assumptions about 
data that are being invalidated by innovative developments in 
technology and data use.  More specifically, a purely categorical 
approach to privacy and data protection fails to recognize the risks 
generated by the expansion in data collection practices and 
technologies.  Assumptions made by policymakers and legislators in 
both the European Union and the United States about managing the 
risks associated with certain types of data thus need to be revisited 
with these emerging threats to privacy in mind. 
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A.  Why Processing Sensitive Data Is Assumed to Entail More Risk 
The sensitivity of a given piece of information is often defined as a 
function of the magnitude and severity of the risks associated with its 
processing.  For example, one set of guidelines on handling sensitive 
health information defines it as “information that carries with it 
unusually high risks in the event of disclosure.”1  Similarly, 
experimental studies surrounding privacy attitudes and behaviors 
have demonstrated that individuals’ perceptions of information 
sensitivity are positively correlated with their perceptions of risk or 
exposure, or the heightened need for privacy.2  It is well-recognized 
that the processing of sensitive information, if not handled properly, 
“can lead to significant forms of harm [to individuals] . . . [and] is the 
kind that exposes the data subject to a high probability of such 
harm.”3 
Indeed, a key difference between sensitive and non-sensitive 
information is the level of risk associated with disclosure of the 
information.  For example, as Professor Scott Skinner-Thompson 
explained, intimate information and political information4 “tend, by 
their nature, to involve higher likelihood of downstream 
 
 1. LYGEIA RICCIARDI, CONSUMER P’SHIP FOR EHEALTH, THE NAT’L P’SHIP FOR 
WOMEN & FAMILIES, PROTECTING SENSITIVE HEALTH INFORMATION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 2 (June 2010), 
http://go.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/Sensitive-Data-
Final_070710_2.pdf?docID=7041 [https://perma.cc/NK5F-9BHJ]. 
 2. Multiple studies provide empirical support for the hypothesis that consumers’ 
assessment of the sensitivity of personal data is positively correlated with their risk 
perceptions of information disclosure. See, e.g., Ardion Beldad et al., I Trust Not 
Therefore It Must Be Risky: Determinants of the Perceived Risks of Disclosing 
Personal Data for E-Government Transactions, 27 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 2233, 
2237 (2011); He Li et al., Examining Individuals’ Adoption of Healthcare Wearable 
Devices: An Empirical Study from Privacy Calculus Perspective, 88 INT’L J. MED. 
INFORMATICS 8, 8 (2016). 
 3. Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1131 (2015); see 
also Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119), art. 4(1) 
[hereinafter GDPR] (defining “data subject,” a common term used in the fields of 
data analytics, as anyone who can be identified, whether through direct or indirect 
means, by reference to information “such as a name, an identification number, 
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, 
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural 
person”). 
 4. These refer to “sexual, medical, or mental health information” and 
“information arguably pertaining to countermajoritarian viewpoints,” respectively. 
Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 162 (2015). 
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consequences (such as employment discrimination resulting from the 
disclosed intimate information or marginalization caused by the 
monitoring of political thought) that they are entitled to special 
protection relative to other forms of information.”5  In other words, 
the main consideration in whether a certain type of data should 
receive heightened legal protection tends to be determined by the 
likelihood and severity of the harms that can arise from its misuse. 
This association between data sensitivity and privacy risk helps to 
explain why both EU and U.S. laws impose heightened obligations on 
entities that process and control data subjects’ sensitive information.6  
Several EU resolutions stipulate that special rules should govern the 
processing of sensitive information in view of the damage that 
individuals might suffer in case of misuse.7  As early as 1995, the Data 
Protection Directive prohibited processing special categories of 
personal information; more recently, the 2018 General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) expanded on several new conditions 
for this kind of sensitive data protection.8 
Article 4 of the GDPR provides definitions for terms found 
throughout the regulation, which are also common in privacy and 
data protection discussions, such as personal data, consent, and 
profiling.9  Notably, the GDPR makes a nuanced distinction between 
controllers and processers, imposing a unique set of requirements 
upon each.10  A controller is defined as any “natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with 
others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of 
 
 5. Id. (“Doctrinally, strict scrutiny is warranted because political thought and 
intimate information are closely related to already-recognized fundamental rights 
such as marital privacy, bodily integrity, and freedom of association . . . [thus, U.S. 
courts] appear more open to informational privacy claims when the dissemination of 
certain categories of information presages direct, downstream consequences, such as 
potential discrimination.”). 
 6. See Note from the Presidency to the Council of the European Union 
16525/1/12 REV 1, Data Protection Package: Report on the Progress Achieved 
Under the Cyprus Presidency 7 (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2016525%202012%20REV
%201 [https://perma.cc/7Q2L-AWP2]. 
 7. Éloïse Gratton, If Personal Information Is Privacy’s Gatekeeper, Then Risk of 
Harm the Key: A Proposed Method for Determining What Counts as Personal 
Information, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH 105, 151 (2014). 
 8. See generally GDPR, supra note 3, pmbl.  While the 1995 Data Protection 
Directive needed to be transposed into Member State law, the GDPR is directly 
applicable to them. 
 9. Id. art. 4. 
 10. See id. art. 24–43. 
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personal data,”11 while a processor is any such entity that processes 
data on behalf of a controller.12  Under the GDPR, controllers tend 
to have greater responsibilities to assess and mitigate the risks of data 
processing,13 defined as “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or 
not by automated means.”14  Under this expansive definition, the 
range of operations falling within the scope of processing includes 
collecting, recording, organizing, structuring, storing, adapting or 
altering, retrieving, consulting, using, disclosing by transmission, 
disseminating or otherwise making available, aligning or combining, 
restricting, erasing, and destroying data.15 
As noted in the GDPR’s recitals, the purpose of which is to express 
“concise reasons” for the law,16 one of the underlying rationales for 
granting specific protection to sensitive information is that 
“[p]ersonal data which are, by their nature, particularly sensitive in 
relation to fundamental rights and freedoms, merit specific protection 
as the context of their processing could create significant risks to 
fundamental rights and freedoms.”17 
Processing information that is sensitive in nature is also deemed 
riskier under U.S. law.  For example, guidance on implementing the 
E-Government Act of 2002 indicates that the addition of health or 
financial information to a database “raises the risks to personal 
privacy” and requires the agency to conduct a Privacy Impact 
Assessment.18  Other legislation and regulatory guidelines on the 
application of risk-based approaches to data protection further 
suggest accounting for the nature of personal information in assessing 
data processing risks.19 
 
 11. Id. art. 4(7). 
 12. Id. art. 4(8). 
 13. Id. art. 24. 
 14. Id. art. 4(2). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Joint Practical Guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission for Persons Involved in the Drafting of European Union Legislation 31, 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3879747d-7a3c-
411b-a3a0-55c14e2ba732/language-en [https://perma.cc/3Y9L-8S4N]. 
 17. GDPR, supra note 3, Recital 51. 
 18. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB M-
03-22, MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND 
AGENCIES: OMB GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY PROVISIONS OF THE 
E-GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2002 Attachment A, § II(B)(b)(9) (2003). 
 19. See Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Statement on the Role of a Risk-Based 
Approach in Data Protection Legal Frameworks (May 30, 2014), 
https://www.pdp.ie/docs/10046.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4HV-X5GV]; see also 
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Finally, in both the European Union and the United States, 
sensitive data is thought to warrant extra protection to “avoid the risk 
of discrimination” based on their use by third parties.20  Indeed, legal 
scholars have noted the “strong kin between data protection and 
discrimination issues,”21 because data protection rights and non-
discrimination rights share a common goal — guaranteeing fairness 
and reducing the imbalance of power between private individuals and 
powerful outside actors who might violate their rights.22  In sum, the 
heavy obligations that come with processing sensitive information 
stem from the assumption that misuse of sensitive data is likely to 
have greater consequences for fundamental rights and freedoms than 
misuses of other, non-sensitive types of data.23 
B.  Legal Protections for Sensitive Data 
Privacy and data protection laws and policies in both the European 
Union and the United States impose higher obligations upon the 
processing of certain types of information, referred to as special 
categories of information, sensitive information, or sensitive data.  
Yet, on both sides of the Atlantic, legislative bodies have taken an 
“ad hoc, anecdotal approach to defining sensitive information, [and] 
 
Addendum to Note from the Presidency to the Council 10227/13 ADD 1, Subject: 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) (May 31, 2013), 
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2013/06/st10227-
ad01.en13.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5S3-LNYH]. 
 20. Yves Poullet, About the E-Privacy Directive: Towards a Third Generation of 
Data Protection Legislation, in DATA PROTECTION IN A PROFILED WORLD 4 (Serge 
Gutwirth et al. eds., 2010); see also Daniel L. Metayer & Julien Le Clainche, From 
the Protection of Data to the Protection of Individuals: Extending the Application of 
Non-Discrimination Principles, in EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION: IN GOOD 
HEALTH? 322, 328 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2012) (arguing that data protection 
rights and non-discrimination rights share a common goal of guaranteeing fairness 
and reducing the imbalance of power between individuals and actors who may violate 
their rights). 
 21. Raphaël Gellert et al., A Comparative Analysis of Anti-Discrimination and 
Data Protection Legislations, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY: DATA MINING AND PROFILING IN LARGE DATABASES 61 (Bart Custers et al. 
eds., 2013). 
 22. See Metayer & Le Clainche, supra note 20, at 322; Poullet, supra note 20, at 4. 
 23. See generally PETER P. SWIRE & KENESA AHMAD, FOUNDATIONS OF 
INFORMATION PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION: A SURVEY OF GLOBAL CONCEPTS, 
LAWS AND PRACTICES 68 (2012); Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Advice Paper on 
Special Categories of Data (“Sensitive Data”), Ref. Ares (2011) 444105, 4 (Apr. 8, 
2011), https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/88417.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YJ5-Y3SA] 
[hereinafter Sensitive Data]. 
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the categories they define as sensitive change very slowly and 
infrequently.”24  Moreover, significant discrepancies exist between 
U.S. and EU law in terms of the categories of information that are 
considered sensitive.  For example, although U.S. courts are unlikely 
to recognize political opinions or beliefs as a type of sensitive data 
due, at least in part, to First Amendment concerns, such data is 
explicitly protected under European law.25  Nonetheless, as the 
ensuing sections of this Article seek to demonstrate, both EU and 
U.S. privacy and data protection laws assume that certain categories 
of information carry specific risks. 
The following sections describe particular provisions within EU 
and U.S. law that protect special categories of information.  In the 
European Union, these include Convention 108, the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive, and the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR).  In the United States, these include the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Family Education 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA), Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), and 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). 
1.  Special Categories of Information in EU Law 
The European Union imposes heightened legal obligations on 
processing sensitive data based on what has been called a 
“categorical” classification scheme, meaning that certain types of 
information are always treated as sensitive.26  This idea — that 
sensitive information is distinct in kind from other kinds of 
information, and therefore requires extra protections — was 
expressed in the European Union’s earliest data protection laws.27  
Indeed, special legal protections for sensitive information processing 
have been in effect since Convention 108 first “ritualised” this by 
 
 24. Ohm, supra note 3, at 1141.  Two famous examples from U.S. law include the 
1998 Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) and the 1994 Driver’s Privacy Protection 
Act (DPPA).  It is generally accepted that the VPPA was created “almost entirely 
because a reporter obtained the video rental records for Judge Robert Bork during 
his confirmation hearings regarding his doomed nomination to the Supreme Court,” 
while the DPPA was “inspired directly by the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, 
killed by a deranged fan who located her using records he purchased from the 
California DMV.” Id. at 1140–41. 
 25. GDPR, supra note 3, art. 9. 
 26. See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HANDBOOK ON 
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 86 (2014). 
 27. Sensitive Data, supra note 23, at 8. 
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reference to sensitive data in 1981,28 thereby enshrining sensitivity as 
a “pivotal element of all further regulations regarding the use of 
personal data.”29  This Convention prohibited processing information 
that reveals a person’s race, political and religious beliefs, health, 
sexual life, or criminal records in the absence of appropriate legal 
protection, which the Member States had to provide through law.30 
Both the 1995 Data Protection Directive (“the Directive”) and the 
GDPR, which went into force on May 25, 2018, strengthened 
protections for the discrete list of data types referred to as special 
categories of information.31  Two specific provisions, Article 8 of the 
Directive and Article 9 of the GDPR, provide protections to special 
categories of information.  By examining each in turn, it is possible to 
understand the boundaries of sensitive information and the rules 
around its processing in the EU. 
The 1995 Data Protection Directive served as the fundamental 
framework for data protection in the European Union for over two 
decades, establishing the groundwork for rules controlling sensitive 
information processing.32  In Article 8, the Directive allowed Member 
States to prohibit the processing of special categories of personal 
data, defined as information that may reveal “racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and . . . data concerning health, and sex life.”33  Article 8 
also contained a list of exceptions to the prohibition, such as explicit 
consent, necessity, protecting vital and legitimate interests of 
 
 28. SPIROS SIMITIS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, REVISITING SENSITIVE DATA: REVIEW 
OF THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF 
THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO 
AUTOMATIC PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA 1, 1–2 (1999).  In line with Convention 
108, British, Dutch, and Spanish laws each grant sensitive data “special status.” Id.  
Although some EU countries, including Austria and Germany, have resisted 
“abstract categorizations of personal data,” such as religious information or 
philosophical information, by promoting a context-oriented appreciation for data 
sensitivity, they were forced to surrender this position in the face of the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive’s explicit list of sensitive information, which was transposed into 
the laws of the Member States. Id. at 2. 
 29. Id. at 1. 
 30. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention for the Protection 
of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, art. 6 (Jan. 28, 
1981), https://rm.coe.int/16800ca434 [https://perma.cc/GE5F-R3UE]. 
 31. See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra 
note 26, at 36. 
 32. Council Directive 95/46, art. 8(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC) [hereinafter Data 
Protection Directive]. 
 33. Id. 
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individuals, and public interest.34  As Professor Spiros Simitis argues, 
Member States constantly challenged the exhaustive categories of 
sensitive data in the Directive by “attempts to either bypass or to 
review the apparently definite list,”35 resulting in a “virtually endless 
list of exceptions” that undermined the protections for sensitive 
information.36 
The idea of granting special protection to sensitive information was 
strengthened when the GDPR, which repealed the Directive, came 
into force in mid-2018.37  Like Convention 108 and the Directive, 
Article 9 of the GDPR prohibits processing special categories of 
information.  Article 9(1) prohibits processing personal data that 
would reveal a person’s “racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership.”38  The 
same provision goes on to prohibit processing “genetic data [or] 
biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural 
person,” and provides that processing of “data concerning health or 
data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall 
be prohibited.”39 
The GDPR builds on the foundation of the laws that came before 
it by defining and including protections for new types of sensitive 
information,40 such as data concerning health,41 genetic data,42 and 
biometric data that uniquely identifies a person,43 and recognizes the 
sensitivity of information regarding sexual orientation.44  The GDPR 
 
 34. Id. art. 8(5). 
 35. SIMITIS, supra note 28, at 3. 
 36. Id. at 3–4. 
 37. Id.; GDPR, supra note 3, art. 94(1). 
 38. GDPR, supra note 3, art. 9(1). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. The GDPR defines the phrase concerning health as “personal data related to 
the physical or mental health of a natural person, including the provision of health 
care services, which reveal information about his or her health status.” Id. art. 4(15). 
 42. Genetic data is defined as “personal data relating to the inherited or acquired 
genetic characteristics of a natural person which give unique information about the 
physiology or the health of that natural person and which result, in particular, from 
an analysis of a biological sample from the natural person in question.” Id. art. 4(13).  
Regarding DNA information, the European Court of Human Rights has suggested 
that it reveals information about ethnic origin, which renders it “sensitive.” S. & 
Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 167, 196. 
 43. Biometric data is defined as “personal data resulting from specific technical 
processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a 
natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural 
person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data.” GDPR, supra note 3, art. 4(14). 
 44. Id. art. 9(1). 
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also introduces measures to protect children’s information.45  For 
example, information services geared specifically to children under 
the age of sixteen are not lawful without parental consent,46 given 
that children may be less cognizant of the risks of data processing and 
their respective rights.47  The GDPR further requires special 
attention from supervisory authorities and data controllers toward 
online services or advertisements directed towards children.48  Data 
controllers are responsible for showing “reasonable efforts to verify” 
parental consent.49  The need to provide transparency when 
processing children’s information is also included in the GDPR 
where, as a rule of general applicability, it requires that procedures 
regarding the use of information should be written in “clear and plain 
language,” a point reemphasized in the context of processing 
children’s information.50 
Although the GDPR is directly applicable to all EU Member 
States, it also provides room for the States to adopt more stringent 
rules on processing special categories of data.51  Thus, Member States 
can introduce “further conditions, including limitations” on the 
processing of “genetic data, biometric data or data concerning 
health.”52  Member States may also create laws that lower the age 
requirements on processing children’s data, on the condition that the 
age not be below thirteen years.53 
While the EU’s omnibus laws, such as the GDPR, apply to all 
entities that process data, whether public or private, the United States 
has adopted a “sectoral” approach towards data protection and 
privacy law — different laws regulate specific industries or uses of 
technology.54  The following section examines comparable U.S. laws 
and how they subject certain types of information processing to 
heightened obligations. 
 
 45. Id. Recital 38. 
 46. Id. art. 8(1). 
 47. Id. Recital 38. 
 48. Id. art. 57(1)(b). 
 49. Id. art. 8(2). 
 50. Id. Recital 58. 
 51. Id. Recital 10. 
 52. Id. art. 9(4). 
 53. Id. art. 8(1). 
 54. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information 
in the United States and European Union, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 879–908 (2014). 
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2.  Information Subject to Heightened Obligations Under U.S. Law 
The categories of information subjected to heightened obligations 
in the United States “are often [categories] which would be 
considered as being of ‘intimate’ nature,” such as personal health 
information.55  In contrast to EU law, nowhere in U.S. privacy law 
can there be found an explicit list of categories of sensitive 
information.  Rather, “narrow sectoral laws” in the United States are 
targeted at specific industries.56  Thus, determining what information 
qualifies as sensitive data under U.S. law can only be done in a 
roundabout way through an examination of the various sectoral laws.  
Examining various sectoral laws can help identify sensitive types of 
data based on the sectors that have been regulated, as U.S. privacy 
laws impose higher obligations on processing certain types of 
information in certain contexts.  For instance, U.S. law subjects the 
processing and use of financial information, students’ educational 
information, health information, and information about children to 
detailed regulations.  To understand how U.S. law delineates the 
boundaries of sensitive information, this section briefly examines 
these sector-specific federal laws: HIPAA, FERPA, COPPA, GLBA, 
and FCRA. 
Health information, which concerns the “inner workings of one’s 
body or mind,” is accorded higher protection under U.S. law because 
invasions of privacy in this realm may violate one’s “individual sense 
of self.”57  Recognizing a growing need to protect private health data 
“in the face of digital distribution of health information,”58 Congress 
enacted HIPAA. 
HIPAA is a federal law that provides nationwide protection for 
“individually identifiable health information.”59  The Privacy Rule of 
HIPAA aims to ensure individuals’ rights to control all forms of their 
health information (oral, written, and electronic) by regulating the 
ways other entities access and use this information.60  It imposes 
 
 55. See, e.g., Gratton, supra note 7, at 165; Skinner-Thompson, supra note 4, at 
162. 
 56. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 54, at 881. 
 57. SWIRE & AHMAD, supra note 23, at 67. 
 58. Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 283, 302–03 (2003). 
 59. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 1177, 110 Stat. 1936, 2029 (1996). 
 60. See Your Rights Under HIPAA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. 
(2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-individuals/guidance-materials-for-
consumers/index.html [https://perma.cc/SYA9-NSPQ]. 
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standardized rules on “covered entities,” which include health plans, 
healthcare providers, and healthcare clearing houses.61  The Privacy 
Rule grants individuals “the right to inspect, review, and receive a 
copy of their medical records and billing records that are held by 
health plans and health care providers” covered by the rule.62  In 
addition, HIPAA’s Security Rule requires covered entities to 
consider the probability and severity of potential risks to the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of protected electronic 
health information. 
Students’ educational records also receive special protection in the 
United States.  The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA) prohibits federally-funded institutions from disclosing 
students’ education records without parents’ or eligible students’ 
consent.63  The law defines education records as “records, files, 
documents, and other materials” that involve information “directly 
related to a student” and “maintained by an educational agency or 
institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution” 
involved in the description of education records.64  More specifically, 
education records include information about grades, attendance, 
disciplinary actions and course lists, as well as health and 
immunization records.65  Health information about students held by a 
university clinic, for example, would fall under FERPA’s protection 
of “treatment records” but excluded from coverage under the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule.66 
Like the EU, the U.S. privacy framework recognizes the 
importance of protecting children’s information.  The fundamental 
aim of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 
 
 61. See Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERV. (2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-
regulations/index.html [https://perma.cc/LY9J-SLPA]. 
 62. See Your Medical Records, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-individuals/medical-records/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/GWW4-A3LF]. 
 63. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2018). 
 64. Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(A). 
 65. See Questions and Answers About Education Records, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/focus/daca-education-records.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BX2F-ERDB]. 
 66. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., JOINT 
GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND 
PRIVACY ACT (FERPA) AND THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 (HIPAA) TO STUDENT HEALTH RECORDS 2 (2008), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/doc/ferpa-hipaa-guidance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5FC4-WA6X]. 
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(COPPA) is to protect children from the risks of data collection 
through websites or mobile apps, and to engage parents in the 
process.67  COPPA subjects website operators and online service 
providers directed at children under the age of thirteen, as well as 
general audience websites and online services (such as mobile apps) 
that knowingly collect personal information from children under the 
age of thirteen, to specific rules such as posting detailed privacy 
notices.68  In addition, operators are required to notify parents and 
obtain their permission before collecting or sharing certain 
information regarding their children.69 
Personal information is broadly defined under COPPA: names, 
addresses, online contact information, user names that include 
contact information (such as an e-mail address), Social Security 
Numbers, “persistent identifiers” that allow recognition across 
different services, geo-location information that allows the 
identification of the child’s street name or city, and any “photograph, 
video, or audio file, where such file contains a child’s image or 
voice.”70  It is of note that states can expand these protections.  
California, for example, recognizes a child’s limited right to be 
forgotten — minors maintain the right to request that certain content 
be removed from websites, social networking sites, mobile apps, and 
other online services.71 
Another industry subject to privacy and data protection regulations 
is the financial sector.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) 
applies to U.S. companies that are significantly engaged “in financial 
activities” and requires them to implement varying security programs 
that contain safeguards depending on the size, complexity, nature, 
and scope of their activities.72  These programs should identify and 
assess risks to consumer information and evaluate the effectiveness of 
 
 67. See Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-
coppa-frequently-asked-questions#General%20Questions [https://perma.cc/G5XZ-
7BDH]. 
 68. See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(A)(1) (2012). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 67. 
 71. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22580–81 (2019). 
 72. 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-
06-674, PERSONAL INFORMATION: KEY FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS DO NOT REQUIRE 
INFORMATION RESELLERS TO SAFEGUARD ALL SENSITIVE DATA (2006), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-06-
674/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-06-674.htm [https://perma.cc/T24N-4SGQ]. 
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current safeguards for controlling these risks.73  The GBLA’s privacy 
protection applies to “nonpublic personal information,” which it 
specifically defines as “personally identifiable financial 
information.”74  The effectiveness of the GLBA in protecting non-
public financial information, however, has been heavily criticized.75  
For example, the Act enables entities to share what might be 
considered sensitive information with affiliates and non-affiliates by 
utilizing notice and opt-out mechanisms.76 
The last U.S. law discussed here is the FCRA, which provides 
protection for a very particular type of financial information: 
consumer reports.77  Because a person’s credit rating in the United 
States influences his or her loan eligibility, interest rates, or ability to 
rent a home,78 consumer reports are afforded special protection 
under U.S. law.  The FCRA is limited in scope — it applies only to 
consumer reporting agencies directly involved in creating consumer 
reports that will be used to evaluate individuals for the purposes of 
employment or credit.79  Its main aim is to promote the accuracy and 
privacy of information regarding consumers.80 
As the preceding sections demonstrate, laws in both the European 
Union and United States single out certain types of information or 
sectors as “sensitive,” which are thereby deserving of heightened legal 
protections.  These include health information, information about 
children and students, and financial information.  Thus, both legal 
systems rely on determinations about the nature, type, or category of 
information to assess its sensitivity and riskiness.  However, as Part II 
argues, this approach is beset by several challenges that it will be 
unable to address.  Although prioritizing sensitive data lies at the core 
of laws that protect individual privacy, this approach is being 
rendered ineffective by innovative techniques of data collection, 
 
 73. See 15 U.S.C. § 6801. 
 74. 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2012). 
 75. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 
1230 (2002) (“The GLB Act has managed to disappoint both industry leaders and 
privacy advocates alike.”). 
 76. See §§ 6802(a)–(b), 6802(b)(2). 
 77. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 78. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW 
AND POLICY 268 (2016) (“Financial privacy is an important topic because of 
Americans’ deep dependence on the credit system.”). 
 79. See Credit Reporting, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/credit-reporting [https://perma.cc/2WK7-
VP7Q]. 
 80. Id. 
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processing, and analysis.  In an era characterized by new and 
unexpected uses of data, privacy and data protection laws are lagging 
years behind. 
The next Part addresses three main challenges to the current 
approach of laws that prioritize sensitive data by category.  This 
Article maintains that these challenges should prompt law and 
policymakers to reconsider ways of protecting privacy in the era of 
big data.  Further, certain types of data no longer exist in isolation 
and thus ought not be guarded in isolation.  As explained in the 
following Parts of this Article, new technologies and innovative data 
analytic techniques have created novel types of data, which are as 
worthy of protection as the traditionally-recognized categories of 
sensitive data, while also blurring the lines between sensitive and non-
sensitive data.  Moreover, lawmakers now must contend with the 
challenge of accounting for the ways in which the context of use for a 
given piece of personal information can influence its level of 
sensitivity.  This Article concludes that these developments have 
rendered the current scheme of legal protections based on type, 
nature, or category of information as rather weak and ineffective, 
which leaves data subjects exposed to significant privacy risks. 
II.  CHALLENGES TO PROTECTING SENSITIVE DATA BY CATEGORY 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the type, nature, or 
category of data — and the accompanying assumptions about the 
greater riskiness of sensitive kinds of data — have been used to 
calibrate legal obligations for data controllers and processors in both 
the European Union and the United States.81  However, there are 
several reasons why using categorical distinctions to prioritize data 
determined to be “sensitive” or “high risk” may not protect 
individuals from the entire spectrum of privacy risks they face today. 
The following sections discuss three practical challenges to laws 
that prioritize sensitive information.  The first challenge concerns the 
growth in data-collecting technologies, which have led to the 
emergence of new types of data.82  This new information can range 
 
 81. Numerous empirical studies have found that consumers’ assessments of the 
sensitivity of personal data are positively correlated with their risk perceptions of 
information disclosure. See, e.g., Beldad et al., supra note 2, at 2233. 
 82. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, 
PRESERVING VALUES 1, 4 (2014); see also Liran Einav & Jonathan D. Levin, The 
Data Revolution and Economic Analysis 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 19035, 2013) [hereinafter BIG DATA] (explaining that “data is 
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from behavioral data produced by online activity and collected by 
social networking sites, to geolocation data produced by cell phone 
and other smart devices that monitor users’ movements and 
activities.83  These developments in data require lawmakers to 
constantly reevaluate and expand the list of information that can be 
considered “sensitive,” complicating how these data can be properly 
protected. 
A second, related challenge is that seemingly-innocuous, non-
sensitive, and non-identifiable types of data can be linked to an 
identity, or to other sensitive data, using innovative analytic 
techniques.84  Many datasets that anonymize or de-identify data — 
that is, tools that remove personally-identifying information such as 
names, addresses, or dates of birth from existing data — may be 
combined with other datasets to re-identify individuals.85  The rise in 
the number of large, publicly-available datasets, even those that do 
not themselves contain any identifying or sensitive data, presents a 
risk to informational privacy. 
A third obstacle is that the “sensitivity” of a given piece of 
information can change depending on the context of its use — the 
same piece of information might be sensitive in one context but not in 
another.  In other words, the sensitivity of data might not be a 
function solely of its nature or type, but also of the way in which it is 
utilized or the ends to which it is put.86  With this concern, 
policymakers must reconsider the effectiveness of the longstanding 
approach that prioritizes information according to nature, type, or 
category.  Rather, policymakers must take into account the context of 
data use when crafting privacy and data protection laws. 
 
now available faster, has greater coverage and scope, and includes new types of 
observations and measurements that previously were not available”). 
 83. See generally Nicole Perlroth & Nick Bilton, Mobile Apps Take Data 
Without Permission, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2012), 
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/google-and-mobile-apps-take-data-books-
without-permission/ [https://perma.cc/Y3LV-BKEM]. 
 84. See BIG DATA, supra note 82, at 8 (“When data is initially linked to an 
individual or device, some privacy-protective technology seeks to remove this 
linkage, or ‘de-identify’ personally identifiable information — but equally effective 
techniques exist to pull the pieces back together through ‘re-identification.’”). 
 85. See id. 
 86. ÉLOÏSE GRATTON, UNDERSTANDING PERSONAL INFORMATION: MANAGING 
PRIVACY RISKS 413 (2013). 
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A.  Ubiquitous Collection and the Ever-Expanding Categories of 
Sensitive Data 
The rate at which personal information is being shared, stored, and 
analyzed has reached unprecedented levels, ever-expanding in scope 
and magnitude.  Today, toys “converse” with children,87 contact 
lenses analyze glucose levels in tears,88 and clothes embedded with 
smart devices respond to touch commands.89  The sheer amount of 
data that is being generated also continues to increase in ways that 
defy imagination.  In 2016, Dropbox users uploaded over 833,000 
files, Instagram users liked nearly 2.5 million posts, Netflix 
subscribers streamed over 86,000 hours of video, and over 3.5 million 
text messages were sent in the United States alone, for every minute 
of every day.90  Moreover, new forms of data about people, such as 
real-time data on their movements, preferences, and behaviors, are 
being collected by a growing number of interconnected devices: “The 
declining cost of collection, storage, and processing of data, combined 
with new sources of data like sensors, cameras, geospatial and other 
observational technologies, means that we live in a world of near-
ubiquitous data collection.”91 
Individuals are also producing more and more data about 
themselves throughout the course of their daily activities.  People 
share both sensitive and non-sensitive information with software and 
 
 87. Cayla is a toy that can “talk and interact, . . . play games, share photos, read 
stories . . . [and] can answer almost any question.”  This Is Cayla, 
MYFRIENDCAYLA.COM, https://www.myfriendcayla.com/meet-cayla-c8hw 
[https://perma.cc/AQ89-LRQ4]. 
 88. See Jonah Comstock, Novartis CEO Comments, New Patent Shed Light on 
Google’s Contact Lens Projects, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Sept. 8, 2015), 
https://www.mobihealthnews.com/46600/novartis-ceo-comments-new-patent-shed-
light-on-googles-contact-lens-projects [https://perma.cc/L3EY-J4DR]; Digital 
Contact Lenses Can Transform Diabetes Care, MED. FUTURIST, 
http://medicalfuturist.com/googles-amazing-digital-contact-lens-can-transform-
diabetes-care/ [https://perma.cc/W9AJ-Q87U] (noting that, with the use of embedded 
sensors and wireless antenna communicating the information to external devices, 
blood glucose levels in tears will be analyzed and the data transmitted to an 
associated app, which will notify users to act or contact their doctors according to the 
results). 
 89. See David Pierce, Google Is Hacking Our Clothes to Work Like 
Touchscreens, WIRED (May 29, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/google-wants-
turn-everything-wearable/ [https://perma.cc/82Z2-HLBT] (“Google is working on an 
ecosystem of apps and services that will let you interact with your phone and other 
gadgets just by grabbing, tapping, swiping, and touching your clothes.”). 
 90. Data Never Sleeps 4.0, DOMO (2016), https://web-assets.domo.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/16_domo_data-never-sleeps-4-2.png [https://perma.cc/8AJU-
XPLV]. 
 91. BIG DATA, supra note 82, at 4. 
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application providers when using their smart devices.92  Given the 
real and perceived benefits accrued by using these devices and 
services, people voluntarily disclose sensitive information, such as 
data regarding their medication intake, dietary habits, or levels of 
fitness to app providers.93  People who use health and fitness apps, for 
example, continuously provide information in real-time about their 
movements,94 exercise habits and physical activity levels,95 how much 
water they drink,96 as well as how anxious or stressed97 they feel at 
various times throughout the day.  People who use online dating apps 
typically share their location, photos, and information about their 
hobbies and interests, with the intention of finding an agreeable 
partner nearby.98  Apps used for mobile banking and other financial 
services collect sensitive financial information, such as Social Security 
Numbers, account numbers, and salary information, as well as various 
kinds of biometric behavioral data.99 
It is of note that websites and app providers may collect more 
sensitive information than they need to merely function.  For 
example, one of the most-downloaded gaming apps in recent years, 
 
 92. See generally Tien Wang et al., Intention to Disclose Personal Information 
Via Mobile Applications: A Privacy Calculus Perspective, 36 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 
531 (2016). 
 93. One study shows that two-thirds of Americans favor using these digital tools 
to manage their health. See Two-Thirds of Americans in Favor of Digital Personal 
Health Management, IMAGING TECH. NEWS (Feb. 24, 2015), 
https://www.itnonline.com/content/two-thirds-americans-favor-digital-personal-
health-management [https://perma.cc/TN53-GBDJ]. 
 94. See, e.g., Steps — Activity Tracker, ITUNES, 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/steps-pedometer-step-counter/id708359518?mt=8 
[https://perma.cc/YW8H-DLDS]. 
 95. See Daily Yoga, GOOGLEPLAY, 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.dailyyoga.inc&hl=en 
[https://perma.cc/JSK4-8FP7]. 
 96. See Water Alert, ITUNES, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/water-alert-
drinking-water/id787142696?mt=8 [https://perma.cc/65ZL-JRMD]. 
 97. See Self-Help for Anxiety Management, ITUNES, 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/self-help-for-anxiety-management/id666767947?mt=8 
[https://perma.cc/KD7P-ZTYM]; see also Kristen Fischer, Best Anxiety Apps of 
2018, HEALTHLINE (Apr. 30, 2018), http://www.healthline.com/health/anxiety/top-
iphone-android-apps# [https://perma.cc/H7JM-ME4Z]. 
 98. For example, one of the most popular dating apps, Tinder, suggests nearby 
“matches.” See Tinder, GOOGLEPLAY, 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.tinder&hl=en 
[https://perma.cc/MMS2-SZX9]. 
 99. See generally Stacy Cowley, Banks and Retailers Are Tracking How You 
Type, Swipe and Tap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/business/behavioral-biometrics-banks-
security.html [https://perma.cc/BQ4P-KDH8]. 
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Pokémon Go,100 attracted criticisms for accessing users’ email 
accounts, photos, stored data, and login information.101  Similar 
outrage occurred when it was discovered that the Uber app was 
continuing to collect information about its users’ location by running 
in the background even while those users were not actively using the 
app.102  Social networking sites also serve as a repository for various 
types of sensitive data—they not only gather information that users 
voluntarily provide, such as their date of birth, where they live, and 
their employment and education history, but also generate novel and 
unique forms of data about users, such as information about the 
composition of and changes to their social networks.103 
These technologies and platforms, which generate and collect novel 
forms of data, are often exempt from the heightened legal obligations 
placed on entities that process sensitive data.104  Take, for example, 
data about social networking activities, which can be readily 
associated with other types of information considered to be sensitive.  
In one study that analyzed the “Facebook Like,” which is “a 
mechanism used by Facebook users to express their positive 
association with . . . online content,” researchers developed a 
predictive model that managed to discover sensitive information 
 
 100. See Mike Sonders, Pokémon Go Daily Revenue: On the Decline, but There’s 
Still Good News, MEDIUM (Dec. 7, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@sm_app_intel/pok%C3%A9mon-go-daily-revenue-on-the-
decline-but-theres-still-good-news-9f9b9b2b8d7 [https://perma.cc/T6E7-2P3T] (“For 
a couple of months after its launch, when looking at combined revenue across both 
iOS and Android U.S. smartphones, Pokémon GO was the top-grossing mobile game 
by a clear margin.”). 
 101. See Laura Hudson, How to Protect Privacy While Using Pokémon Go and 
Other Apps, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/technology/personaltech/how-to-protect-
privacy-while-using-pokemon-go-and-other-apps.html [https://perma.cc/EW98-
JBSE]. 
 102. See Jennifer Abel, EPIC Fail for Uber’s New Privacy Policy: FTC Asked to 
Block “Deceptive Data Collection,” CONSUMER AFF. (June 23, 2015), 
https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/epic-fail-for-ubers-new-privacy-policy-ftc-
asked-to-block-deceptive-data-collection-062315.html [https://perma.cc/JU43-37C4]. 
 103. See Susan B. Barnes, A Privacy Paradox: Social Networking in the United 
States, FIRST MONDAY, Sept. 4, 2006, at 11, 
http://firstmonday.org/article/view/1394/1312 [https://perma.cc/2DAK-D5VH]. 
 104. Although a variety of mobile apps and devices collect, process, and access 
sensitive information, they are not necessarily subject to U.S. sectoral privacy laws.  
For instance, apps that track people’s sleep schedules, exercise habits, diets, and 
levels of water intake are not subject to HIPAA, which only applies to doctors, 
hospitals, insurers, and their business associates. See generally Ohm, supra note 3, at 
1131 (arguing that HIPAA “should be expanded to include any company possessing 
sensitive health information,” including the developers of mobile apps). 
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about users, including their sexual orientation, ethnicity, and religious 
and political beliefs.105  To test the accuracy of the model, its 
predictions were compared with sensitive information that the study 
participants provided voluntarily.106  In the end, the researchers were 
able to develop a predictive algorithm that could make “guesses” 
about a person’s sensitive data with a high degree of accuracy, 
between 85% and 95%, merely from the Facebook Like data collected 
about individuals.107 
The digital “identifiers” in a predictive profile, which may be 
linked to a particular IP address, device, or browser, are another type 
of data that does not fall into one of the traditionally-protected 
categories of sensitive data.108  There are at least two basic types of 
profiles companies can create about an individual: predictive and 
explicit.  An explicit profile is created when a user registers with a 
website and provides personally-identifying information; a predictive 
profile is created through “inference from observing and collecting 
user behavior over time, particularly by monitoring visited pages and 
ads viewed or clicked on.”109  A predictive profile can be made 
explicit at a later point in time — when a user (about whom a 
predictive profile already exists) creates an account on a website, the 
predictive profile can be matched with the personally-identifying 
information the user provides to create an explicit profile.110  
Furthermore, platforms, technology companies, and publishers have 
the ability to cross-match data and create individual profiles using 
these identifiers, and can thus follow a person’s activities across smart 
devices.111  While practical for users, cross-device tracking gives data 
 
 105. Michal Kosinki et al., Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from 
Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5802, 5802 (2013). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Poullet, supra note 20, at 11–13. 
 109. See GRATTON, supra note 86, at 412–13. 
 110. See Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 2/2010 on Online Behavioral 
Advertising, 00909/10/EN, WP 171, 7 (June 22, 2010), 
https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2010/wp171_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MYM-2RVY] (“The 
profile based on analysis of the cookies stored on the terminal equipment of the data 
subject can be enriched with aggregated data derived from the behavior of data 
subjects who exhibit similar behavioral patterns in other contexts.”). 
 111. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CROSS-DEVICE TRACKING: AN FTC STAFF REPORT 1–2 
(2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/cross-device-tracking-
federal-trade-commission-staff-report-january-2017/ftc_cross-
device_tracking_report_1-23-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X4K-VY8S]. 
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collectors a bigger window into users’ lives.112  A single smart device 
effectively stores data on one’s health, finances, and location in the 
same place, and each smart device may be linked with any number of 
other smart devices. 
Another example of a new form of data that can be used to identify 
an individual is web-browsing history, or the record of webpages a 
person visits over the Internet.  Researchers in one study were able to 
identify individuals with a high degree of accuracy by combining their 
browsing histories with auxiliary public data.113 As the authors of that 
study noted, “browsing histories contain tell-tale marks of 
identity.”114  Because a person is more likely to click on links shared 
by their specific contacts in a social network, in more than seven out 
of ten cases, the researchers were able to identify the “owner” of a 
browsing history by comparing it with the accounts that person 
follows on social media.115 
The reality that web browsing history can reveal personal 
information about users matches anecdotes and survey evidence that 
suggest individuals consider their web browsing history to be a type of 
sensitive data.116  A person’s browsing histories can contain sensitive 
information about his or her health, including any stigmatizing 
medical conditions they might have.  After being counseled by a 
health care professional about a sexually-transmitted disease, for 
example, many people seek health information related to their 
medical condition on the Internet.117  Several studies have found that 
most Internet users disapprove of advertisers having access to records 
of their online behavior in order to market products and target 
advertisements to them.118  This further suggests that most people 
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consider their web searches to be private, sensitive information and 
would approve of some legal protections to that effect. 
A final example of data that should be fully afforded legal 
protections as a category of sensitive information is data about 
movements and locations generated through mobile device tracking.  
Examining how a person’s physical location changes throughout the 
day can reveal a detailed profile of that person’s life.  Several states in 
the United States have already decided that this sort of “tracking” 
warrants protection.119  Additionally, the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Jones understood that sensitive information can be readily 
inferred from real-time tracking of a person’s movements and 
location: 
Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably 
private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: 
trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion 
clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal 
defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, 
the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and 
on.120 
Because of advances in surveillance technology, this type of 
tracking data provides a wide window into a person’s life, revealing 
sensitive information about him or her that simply would not have 
been possible to obtain, or would be prohibitively expensive to do so, 
just a couple of decades ago.121  The underlying justification for giving 
additional protection to this type of information is that “the 
incremental privacy threat posed by the government’s acquisition of 
information increases as more information is obtained . . . .”122  As 
the D.C. Circuit Court explained in United States v. Maynard: 
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Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a 
story not told by any single visit, as does one’s not visiting any 
of these places over the course of a month.  The sequence of a 
person’s movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a 
gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but that trip 
followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store 
tells a different story.123 
Moreover, as with other types of data, location data can be 
combined with other datasets to identify specific individuals: “All 
kinds of information can be connected to a geographic location, such 
as financial data, health data and other consumer behavioural 
data.”124  Even away from personal devices, new ways of tracking 
people are being developed.  For instance, billboards with small 
cameras can identify passers-by, and roadside billboards will soon use 
mobile location information to better target advertisements to 
drivers.125 
This past section has discussed the proliferation of novel forms of 
data that tend to be exempt from existing laws and lists of “sensitive” 
information.  Across the United States and the European Union, 
these developments will require lawmakers to constantly reevaluate 
and expand the list of information that is deemed worthy of 
heightened legal protection. This is one of several challenges to the 
design of privacy and data protection laws that can withstand the test 
of time.  Turning to another key obstacle, the following section 
describes how the combination of “non-sensitive” pieces of 
information and other kinds of publicly-available data can be used to 
uniquely identify individuals or reveal sensitive information about 
them.  It also shows how the proliferation of massive, open datasets, 
combined with advanced analytics, blurs the distinction between 
sensitive and non-sensitive data that has long been the heart of law 
and policymaking in privacy and data protection. 
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B.  Uncovering Sensitive Data Through Re-Identification 
Various types of data that have tended not to be considered 
identifiable or sensitive in isolation can, in practice, be used to 
uniquely identify a person, to reveal sensitive information about 
them, and lead to significant privacy harms.  Indeed, the boundaries 
between different categories of information are becoming 
increasingly blurred today.  To many, the notion that we should assign 
the label of “personally-identifiable information” to some data points 
and not to others has become “outdated.”126 Modern technologies 
and data analytic techniques allow sensitive information about 
individuals to be discerned from publicly-available or “open” 
datasets127 that continuously increase in size and number.128  
Examples of these types of datasets range from user-generated 
reviews on websites such as Google or Yelp (which link a person to 
certain geographic locations, travel destinations, tastes, and financial 
means), to educational records from massive open online courses 
released by providers such as edX.129  The expanding volume of data 
that exists across various channels and platforms and has become 
accessible to the public is thus challenging pre-determined categories 
of sensitive data.130 
Researchers have shown that seemingly unrelated datasets can be 
aggregated to link publicly-available data about a person to that 
person’s identity or to sensitive information about him or her.  Using 
a method known as data linking or data fusion, which brings together 
data from various sources,131 any piece of information can become 
identifying when combined with other bits of information.132  As 
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Professors Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove explain, “technologists 
can take information that appears on its face to be non-identifiable 
and turn it into identifiable data.”133  In other words, the anonymity 
of the owners of sensitive information can be unmasked through 
techniques that re-identify people in so-called de-identified 
datasets.134  As a 2014 White House Report on big data pointed out, 
“personally identifiable information can be derived or inferred from 
datasets that do not even include personal identifiers.”135  
Anticipating these developments over twenty years ago, Joel 
Reidenberg and Paul Schwartz noted: 
The ability of information technology to combine and share data 
makes impossible any abstract noncontextual, evaluation of the 
impact of disclosing a given piece of personal information.  The 
impact of bureaucratic use of personal information, whether merely 
personal or highly sensitive, depends on the means of processing, the 
kinds of databases linked together, and the ends to which 
information will be used.136 
One of the most widely-cited examples of data-linking and re-
identification comes from a study of the Netflix Prize.  Netflix 
publicly released a dataset with nearly 1.5 million ratings given by 
500,000 of its subscribers — this was to crowdsource improvements to 
the algorithm Netflix uses to predict how users rate films, and thus 
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better tailor film suggestions to users.137  Although names and 
account names were removed, the dataset included information on all 
the films each user watched, the ratings they gave, and the date each 
rating was given.138  Comparing the ratings in the Netflix data with 
ratings that were posted by known users on the Internet Movie 
Database (IMDb), researchers were able to specifically identify 
several individuals in the Netflix dataset and have access to their 
viewing histories.139 
The practice of de-identifying data by removing explicit identifiers 
such as names, addresses, or phone numbers has been shown to be 
“not sufficient to render data anonymous because combinations of 
attributes often combine uniquely to re-identify individuals.”140  
Another well-known study re-identified people in a de-identified 
hospital dataset that contained their diagnoses, procedures, and 
medications using publicly-available voter registration lists.141  The 
study concluded that 87% of the U.S. population could likely be 
identified by their unique combination of zip code, gender, and date 
of birth, while more than half (53%) could be identified by their 
unique combination of city/town/municipality, gender, and date of 
birth.142 
Data that is frequently collected by social networking sites can also 
be combined with ancillary data to identify or reveal sensitive 
information about people.  In one study, researchers used facial 
recognition technology to link an image of a person’s face to personal 
information about the same person that could be found online, 
including that person’s Social Security Number.143  Researchers were 
able to uncover the identity of an anonymous or unidentified person, 
and even retrieve sensitive information about the person in real time, 
simply by using social networking profiles, search queries to data 
aggregation websites such as Spokeo.com, statistical analysis, data 
mining, and facial recognition techniques.144  It is particularly of note 
that the researchers were able to identify even those persons who 
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attempted to maintain anonymity online, by, for example, using a 
pseudonym on a dating website, as well as passers-by in the “offline” 
world.145  Studies such as these demonstrate the potential of 
technology, much of which is readily available on the market, to 
pinpoint and collect sensitive information about people. 
This Article has thus far examined how advancements in 
technology and the proliferation of big data have rendered the 
traditional “categorical” distinction between sensitive and non-
sensitive data as outdated, and a practically ineffective tool for law 
and policymaking.  This is because innocuous-seeming bits of 
information can be linked with publicly-available datasets to reveal 
private, personal, sensitive information.  The final part of this section 
addresses another way in which the “categorical” approach to 
prioritizing sensitive data falls short of providing effective privacy 
protections: the fact that the sensitivity of a given piece of data is 
contingent upon the context in which it is used.  Without 
acknowledging the role that context plays in data sensitivity, 
lawmakers in both the European Union and United States will 
continue to struggle to properly protect data subjects’ privacy 
interests. 
C.  How the Context of Data Use Affects Sensitivity 
Another practical challenge to the prioritization of sensitive data 
involves the relationship between the context or purpose of 
information use and its level of sensitivity.  Relying on type, nature, 
or category of information as a guide for determining data sensitivity 
promotes the view that all pieces of information that fall under a 
given category are equally sensitive at all times — but this may not 
always be the case.146  The level of risk associated with any piece of 
data is not entirely dependent upon its nature or type, but is usually 
the product of several variables: “situation-specific circumstances, the 
intentions of the parties involved, the kind of information being 
sought and the way it is processed.”147  In other words, personal 
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information may become more or less sensitive, in terms of the 
potential harm it can cause to individuals, depending on the 
context.148  Simply prioritizing certain “categories” of information 
without taking into account the context of use might be too blunt an 
approach to protect data subjects’ privacy.  This approach may not 
only inhibit benign or beneficial uses of sensitive data, but also fail to 
recognize the harmful uses of data that is deemed non-sensitive in 
different contexts. 
Indeed, numerous experimental studies have demonstrated that 
public perceptions about information sensitivity are shaped by the 
context in which information is disclosed.149  For instance, 
demographic information such as name, email, mobile phone number, 
and mailing address are typically perceived as low in sensitivity.150  
But in the purchasing context, when demographic information is 
combined with financial information such as credit card and pin 
numbers, the same demographic information is perceived as highly 
sensitive.151  Likewise, in job hunting contexts, when demographic 
information is combined with personal identification information such 
as identification photos, it is perceived to be highly sensitive.152 
Moreover, a wide range of sensitivity levels can be found within the 
same “category” of data.  For instance, the term health data may refer 
to a diagnosis of a common illness, such as a cold or the flu, as well as 
to a serious disease associated with stigmatization,153 but to classify all 
information about one’s health as of the same sensitivity level would 
be a potentially dangerous oversimplification of the data.154 
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As noted earlier, a key factor in determining whether any given 
piece of information is sensitive is the level of risk associated with 
it.155  It follows that before any piece of information can be deemed 
sensitive, it must be established that its exposure would be harmful to 
the data subject.  But demonstrating the existence of such harm has 
been an elusive task, which has proven difficult for a variety of 
reasons, some judicial or constitutional and others empirical.156 
Professor Éloïse Gratton distinguishes between three different 
types of data use by data controllers and processors: positive (uses 
that benefit the data subject), negative (uses that harm the data 
subject), and neutral (uses that neither benefit nor harm the data 
subject, but typically benefit the entity handling or analyzing the 
data).157  Importantly, Gratton’s distinctions are not between the 
category, nature, or type of information itself, but between different 
uses of information.158  More specifically, she distinguishes between 
uses that create benefits, lead to harms, or do not affect the data 
subject at all.159  From this standpoint, the category of the data 
remains constant; it is the uses or the ends towards which the data is 
put that alter its sensitivity level.160  This view thus acknowledges that 
the same piece of information can lead to harms if used in some ways 
but lead to benefits if used in others, or might even remain neutral in 
some circumstances. 
Consider, for example, different uses of data within the industry of 
web analytics, which seeks to understand and monetize user’s online 
behaviors.  Potential positive benefits for data subjects include more 
personalized services, products, and advertisements, while uses that 
may be neutral include those that allow an organization to develop 
new tools or services.161 Yet, there are several potential harms 
stemming from the web data analytics: 
One could claim that providing only certain customers with specials 
may trigger a risk of objective harm to other customers 
(discrimination).  Others may find that, as with targeted advertising, 
this may limit the various choices offered to consumers.  This means 
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that whether information used for analytic purposes is considered 
personal [or sensitive] will depend on the exact use and whether this 
specific use may cause objective harm to an individual.162 
If data controllers automatically or by default prioritize certain 
types or categories of data without considering how that data is used, 
they likely ignore how the benefits and risks of the same piece of data 
can differ from one context to another.  In other words, the likelihood 
and severity of the harms or benefits of data processing depend upon 
how data is used, as well as on the context in which it is processed.163  
This feature of data processing and sensitivity-variability poses a 
critical challenge for lawmakers who seek to design laws that can both 
protect privacy and enhance beneficial data uses.  Challenging as this 
may be, however, it is vital to contend with in the face of a world in 
which data is growing ever-more complex and ubiquitous. 
III.  RETHINKING SENSITIVE INFORMATION 
This Article has thus far analyzed how policymakers in both the 
United States and the European Union prioritize sensitive 
information as a category, and discussed several practical challenges 
with this approach.  As the border between sensitive and non-
sensitive information becomes increasingly blurry due to big data, 
data linking, and re-identification capabilities, laws that prioritize 
sensitive information based on category might leave data subjects 
vulnerable to significant risks.  Without some degree of protections 
for non-sensitive data categories, many privacy threats will remain — 
given the rapid pace of change in the data and informational 
landscape, risk schemes around information sensitivity need to be re-
evaluated. 
The practical challenges in prioritizing sensitive information are, in 
some ways, attributable to changes in technology.  Dealing with 
technology that is constantly evolving has long been a key challenge 
for data protection laws.164  Companies and governments retain vast 
amounts of information on people by connecting different data sets 
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and data points to create digital dossiers.165  Today, there is no escape 
from leaving traces that can be recorded.166  Moreover, because re-
identification can be achieved through publicly-available tools, 
measures aimed at enhancing privacy, such as blurring facial images 
in databases or relying on individual opt-ins, may be ineffective.167  
Although laws that regulate the collection of a single type of sensitive 
data about users may be effective at mitigating well-known privacy 
risks, the collection of this data en masse is generating new risks. 
The problems associated with prioritizing sensitive data 
categorically are exacerbated by the fact that people share and 
generate an increasing amount of data through various applications, 
platforms, technological accessories, and wearable devices — all of 
which track multiple aspects of users’ daily activities.168  Reliance on 
self-tracking as a means of self-improvement or self-reflection, and 
the concomitant desire to “quantify” oneself,169 may continue to grow 
into the future.  New technologies will inevitably be developed to 
meet this demand, producing new types and greater quantities of 
data, at least some of which will entail a high degree of risk and thus 
deserve heightened legal protection.  These trends have, and certainly 
will continue, to fundamentally alter the boundaries of what 
information people consider sensitive and private. 
The lists of special information in the European Union and 
information subject to heightened obligations under U.S. law, both 
discussed in this Article, are notable not only for what they include 
but also for what they leave out.  Search queries, web browsing 
history, and contacts on social networking sites are examples of types 
of data that have tended not to be regarded as highly sensitive or 
risky, and have received less protection than other categories of 
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information.170  But, as demonstrated here, this “non-sensitive data” 
can be used to identify or reveal sensitive information about a person, 
such as their health conditions, sexual preferences, political 
associations, and religious practices.171 
An unfathomable number of data points can be pooled together to 
compile a profile for an individual within seconds.  These 
advancements in technology have generated novel types of data, 
which call into question the distinction between sensitive and non-
sensitive information.172  The increasing ease with which 
disaggregated bits of data from around the web can be swept up and 
compiled into a single profile, linking presumably non-sensitive data 
with sensitive data, should prompt legislators to recognize these 
profiles as a new type of sensitive information deserving of stronger 
protections.  Adding these novel data types to the list of special 
categories of information, however, would only be a first step. 
As opposed to the categorical approach, the contextual approach 
to data considers how the context in which information is used affects 
its level of sensitivity.173  This perspective shifts the focus away from 
the category of data, avoiding the question of what categories are or 
are not sensitive, to the manner of data use and its eventual 
consequences.174  Many risks may not be identified if the context of 
disclosure is overlooked.175  Uses of data that benefit the data subject, 
regardless of the type of data in question, should not be subject to 
processing restrictions, while uses of data that result in harms to the 
data subject often should be.176 
Although it expanded the European Union’s list of categories of 
sensitive information, the GDPR indicates a shift towards a 
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contextual approach to determine information sensitivity.177  In their 
advice paper, issued a year after the proposals for the GDPR were 
made public, the Article 29 Working Party noted that several 
Member States “believe that the context and/or the purpose of 
processing should be taken into account when assessing the issue of 
sensitivity.”178  The Working Party also noted that one of the 
shortcomings of the current categorizing approach, as embodied in 
the 1995 Directive, is that a “closed list [of sensitive information] is 
inflexible and unable to react to the context of processing as well as 
new forms of processing which might occur in the course of ongoing 
technological developments . . . .”179 
The issue of defining and protecting sensitive information has also 
been subject to debate recently in the United States, especially after 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced a new 
rule that Internet Service Providers, such as Comcast and AT&T, 
need to require opt-in consent to collect and use sensitive 
information, including “precise geo-location, financial information, 
health information, children’s information, social security numbers, 
web browsing history, app usage history, and the content of 
communications.”180  Broadband firms challenged the FCC’s 
authority to impose this rule on them,181 and President Donald 
Trump signed a resolution to repeal the rule.182  Resistance by 
industry to regulations that would impose restrictions on the 
collection and use of sensitive information may be another factor that 
prompts lawmakers to rethink how to afford legal protections to these 
types of information. 
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CONCLUSION 
EU and U.S. information privacy laws have long relied on 
categorical distinctions to set priorities regarding legal protections, 
obligations, and restrictions on data processing activities.  This 
approach, based on the assumption that information that is sensitive 
in nature tends to be associated with greater risks, remains at the core 
of privacy laws on both continents.  The effectiveness of this 
approach, however, is steadily diminishing today as the long-standing 
distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive information, which 
was always on shaky ground, has all but collapsed.  The exponential 
rise in the kinds and amount of data about us that is being collected, 
stored, and processed every day has brought about a reality in which a 
just a couple of innocuous data points are all that is needed to 
uniquely identify a person or to reveal sensitive information about 
them. 
Classifying data according to its nature or type and prioritizing data 
considered sensitive is an essential first step in risk assessment — but 
this step is only the beginning.  Relying entirely on the sensitivity 
level of a piece of data to determine the risks associated with it will 
fall short of adequately protecting data subjects’ privacy.  Data 
controllers and regulators must therefore consider other factors, in 
addition to the category of data or its sensitivity level, when 
determining the risks posed by data processing.  There is certainly a 
need to interpret sensitive information broadly, and for laws to 
extend protection to newly-emerging types of data that can uniquely 
identify or reveal sensitive information about individuals.  But it is 
also imperative for law and policymakers to go beyond the category-
based regulation of sensitive information if they are to properly 
protect privacy. Moving forward, policymakers should prioritize 
sensitive information understood broadly, while also simultaneously 
protecting against the risks posed by harmful contexts of data use. 
A worst-case scenario is that the legal prioritization of certain 
categories of information deemed special or sensitive may 
inadvertently lead to the neglect of risks associated with other types 
of data processing.  It is not too much of a stretch to say that all data 
may be sensitive, or that there is a minimum level of sensitivity 
present in every piece of data. No data can ever be entirely 
disassociated from risk and harm.  To believe otherwise would be to 
fail to look beyond the nature of data. 
 
